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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY SMITH, 
Plaintiff and ] 
Appellant, . . • ] 
vs. 
LINDA K. JACOBSON SMITH, ] 
Defendant and 
Respondent 
i Case No. 14695 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
In general, respondent agrees with appellant's brief in 
the statement of facts and the citation of the law. However, the 
emphasis of appellant's brief interprets both the facts and the 
cases in a light most favorable to his point of view, seeking a 
substitution of the Supreme Court's judgment for that of the 
trial court. This court has reiterated many times, in countless 
ways, that upon review the facts will be regarded most favorably 
for the respondent with due respect for the opportunity of the 
trier of the facts to observe the witnesses, even in equity cases, 
Cox v. Cox. 532 P.2d 994, (Utah, 1975). 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The trial court, faced with the dilemma of deciding which 
of two acceptable parents should he awarded custody of two III tie 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
children, ordered home evaluation reports from the Division of 
Family Services of the State Department of Social Services 
(R. 57, 61), observed and heard each parent and their new spouses, 
and interviewed in chambers the older of the two children. 
The Smiths have a monthly income of $1296 (R. 59). The 
Moores have a monthly income of $1380. Both homes were recommended 
as adequate in all respects by the Department of Social Services. 
In a memorandum decision, the judge struggled with the 
agony of Solomon's Munderstanding heart'1 to reach the conclusion 
that the children should be in the custody of their natural mother: 
This is probably the most difficult case the Court 
has been called upon to decide. The issue presented 
is the custody of two children born to two loving 
parents each of whom wants the privilege of nurturing 
and training these children. The daughter is an 
attractive, bright, well-adjusted girl and I have 
every reason to believe that the boy is or will be 
just as charming. The Court has to decide whether 
their overall interests will be best served by 
remaining in the father's household or whether the 
children's best interests will be served by placing 
them with their natural mother. The father's house-
hold, where the children now are, has two older 
children living there. The father works a night shift 
for the Ogden Police Department. The mother in that 
household is a very loving person, but I think that 
even she would concede that where the homes are 
otherwise equal, the natural mother has the edge. 
There is the added consideration that the mother and 
her present husband, by the acquisition of the new 
home, have properly positioned themselves to care for 
these children. Within the next few years, the question 
of having her own bedroom will become more and more 
important to Kirsten. Her training through the years 
of puberty, it seems to me, will come easy through her 
natural mother. I conclude therefore that custody 
should go to the mother with liberal visitation rights 
of the father which are to include extended visitation 
rights during summer vacation from school. (R. 68) 
-2-
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In making this decision, the judge was presented with 
the mind-boggling speed of disruption in modern family relationships. 
On August 10th, 1975, Randy Smith, the appellant, informed his wife, 
Linda, that he wanted a divorce (Tr. 49, R* 134). On August 28th, 
Linda met with Randy's attorney and signed a Consent and Waiver 
to a Divorce Complaint which sought to deprive her of the custody 
of her children (R. 6 ) . Although the trial court found that 
there was no duress or coercion involved in the signing of the 
stipulation (R. 69), Linda testified that she was at the time not 
"concerned about the papers" (Tr. 48; R. 133) but "mostly [about] 
the kids and my health." Forty days later, on October 10th, 1975, 
{Jr. 173; R. 258; cf. typographical error in Findings, R. 71) 
Randy married Vickie, who was divorced and maintaining a home for 
her two children, Tracy, 14, and Jo Ann, 12. Tracy testified in 
behalf of his new stepfather: 
I have had three dads, and he is the best one I 
have had...(Tr. 167; R. 252). 
Twenty-one days after the Smith marriage, on November 1, 1975, 
Linda married another Randy...Randy Moore. She immediately began 
proceedings to regain custody of the children, with a Petition to 
vacate and set aside the Divorce, but the matter was not disposed 
of until June 23, 1976, upon a Petition to Modify. 
Counsel for Plaintiff-appellant, Randy Smith, urged 
that the petition was inadequate in that it did not allege the 
conclusion of changed conditions (Tr. 6, R. 91) but the lower 
-3-
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court pointed out that Paragraph 3 alleged that the defendant 
(Linda Smith) "is now married and is better qualified..." 
Counsel for both parties were confused by the rapid change of 
marriage partners, causing plaintiff's counsel to agree that a 
remarriage would be a material change of circumstances sufficient 
to support modification of the Decree (Tr. 6, R. 91 K 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT A 
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE. 
Respondent agrees with the statement of Appellant's 
Point I that modification of divorce decree necessitates showing 
of substantial change of conditions, but wishes to refute the 
implication that no such showing was here made. 
Linda Smith was naturally shocked and panic-stricken by 
the sudden demand of her husband for a divorce (R. 58; Tr. 50, R. 135) 
she was sick at the time (Tr. 50, R. 135) and was making less 
money than was appellant (Tr. 45, R. 130). Within three months 
these conditions had changed and she petitioned to set aside the 
decree. She had remarried, her health had improved, she and her 
husband were buying a house, the combined income in her new family 
was $1380 as compared to $1296 earned by her former husband and 
Except perhaps in a case like the present one, obtained 
upon default where the issues of custody and finances have not 
been litigated. See Lahart v. Lahart, 13 Wash. App. 452, P.2d 145 
(1975) where the court held that a showing of change of circumstances 
is not necessary in such a case. 
-4-
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his new wi fee 
The court was entitled to consider all of these factors 
in determining a change of child custody. The case of Robinson v. 
Robinson. 15 Utah 2d 293, 391 P.2d 434 (1964) cited by appellant 
was a case where the Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial 
court's denial of an order to change custody where the children 
had been in the home of the father for four or five years and 
were happy and well-adjusted. 
As we have often observed, on appeal it is advisable 
to allow considerable latitude of discretion to the 
trial court in such matters because of his advantaged 
position to judge the personalities and characters of 
those involved. See Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah 2d 198, 
389, P.2d 1023. In doing so here we are not persuaded 
that he abused his discretion nor that the order should 
be reversed. 391 P.2d at 436. 
In the instant case, the children cannot be said to have 
put down permanent roots. Economic advantages and more individual 
attention in the smaller family are available through the ordered 
change. In addition, the children of tender years will be in 
the home of their natural mother. These considerations led the 
trial court to its difficult decision and there is neither allegation 
nor evidence of an abuse of the court's discretion. 
POINT II 
WIFE HAS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO CUSTODY OF MINORS UNDER 
TEN YEARS OF AGE; BUT TRIAL COURT IS COMPELLED TO GIVE SERIOUS 
WEIGHT TO THE NEED OF YOUNG CHILDREN FOR THEIR NATURAL MOTHER. 
Respondent has no argument to make against the proposition 
-5-
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that the mother is not invariably and always entitled to custody 
under the presumption of U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-10, and that the 
paramount objective of a custody action is to provide for the 
welfare of the children, Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 
P.2d 16 (1958), In Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 99k (1975) the Supreme 
Court made its most recent delineation of the rule to answer 
this often-challenged concept in child-custody cases: 
In addition to and quite beyond the rights of the 
parents, there is the important principle that the 
paramount consideration is the 1ong-term welfare 
and adjustment of the children. That being so, 
we think there is wisdom in the traditional 
patterns of thought that the roles of the mother 
and father in the family are such that, all things 
being comparatively equal, the children should be 
in the care of their mother, especially so children 
of younger years; and that this may be true even 
where the divorce is granted to the father. 
532 P.2d at 996. 
POINT II I 
MODIFICATION OF A DIVORCE DECREE BY CHANGING CUSTODY OF 
CHILDREN IS NOT A USURPATION OF APPELLATE POWER BUT A NECESSARY, 
CONTINUING AND SANCTIONED POWER OF THE DISTRICT COURTS. 
The award of custody of children is not permanent, but 
may be subsequently modified when changing times and circumstances 
dictate a custodial change to comport with the best interests and 
welfare of the child and the parties involved, Mecham v. Mecham, 
Skk P.2d 479 (Utah, 1975). 
U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5 provides in part: 
...The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with 
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respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, 
the custody of the children and their support and 
maintenance, or the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary... 
The cases of Harward v. Harward and Peterson v. Peterson 
cited by Appellant are inapplicable to the instant case and the 
argument is completely without merit, 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court gave careful, concerned attention to 
every available consideration involved in this action and determined 
that the children involved should be living with their natural 
mother. There is no evidence of abuse of discretion and the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V~J? 
fUSSELL J. HADLEY 
Attorney for Respondent" 
70 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 1765 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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